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By marrying and raising children, parents participate in a system of gift-exchange in 
which the gifts in question are human lives, and the parties to the exchange are the 
kinship groups recognised in the society concerned.  Fertility reflects the attitudes of 
prospective parents to their place in the existing system of reproductive exchange, and 
the  relationships  of  cooperation  and  authority  which  it  implies  –  as  well  as  their 
confidence in the system’s continuing viability. It is shown that this view is compatible 
with    earlier    ideas  about  self-regulating  population  systems  –  and  that  changing 
economic  circumstances  are  an  important  source  of  discrepancy  between  existing 
exchange  systems  and  the  attitudes  and  expectations  of  prospective  parents.  The 
discussion is developed with reference to data on European societies, including a case-
study  from  the  Alps,  and  concludes  with  an  assessment  of  the  relevance  of  the 
anthropological theory of gift exchange to contemporary fertility patterns in Europe and 
beyond.       
 
 
                                                            
1 Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany.  Heady: Fertility as a process of social exchange  
466    http://www.demographic-research.org  
1. Introduction  
In this paper I will draw on anthropological theory to offer a view of the connection 
between  economic  organization,  social  relationships  and  fertility.  The  approach 
developed here is based on the idea that more is involved in fertility decisions than 
concerns about the welfare of the parents and their potential offspring – and that parents 
have children, in part at least, for the sake of other people. The discussion will focus on 
the possible bases of an obligation to have children, and how these connect with the 
strategic moves that can be made to create human and social capital. I will formulate 
these  connections  in  terms  of  theories  of  gift  exchange.    The  idea  that  exchange 
processes may be involved in systems of fertility regulation is not itself new, but it is 
usually presented in the context of specific cultural forms (Fricke 1997) or stages of 
economic development (Lesthaeghe 1983: 411) – and the content of the exchanges is 
often conceptualised in economic terms as a matter of intergenerational flows of wealth 
and practical assistance (Caldwell 1976, 2005). As we shall see, gift exchange in the 
anthropological sense is distinct from economic exchange – though typically linked to 
it.  I shall argue in this paper that the principles of gift exchange are relevant to fertility 
levels  in  all  societies,  and  underline  this  point  by  drawing  most  of  the  empirical 
material  referred  to  here  from  contemporary  Europe  –  an  area  in  which  kinship 
institutions, and associated systems of exchange, are often thought to have been reduced 
to little more than residual phenomena.        
The  discussion  proceeds  in  five  stages.  In  section  2  there  is  a  brief  review  of 
Mauss’s theory of gift exchange, and its application to kinship by Lévi-Strauss and 
other writers (which I refer to as ‘reproductive exchange’).  In  section 3, I consider the 
implications of reproductive exchange theory for fertility – and compare it with other 
theoretical  approaches.  Section  4  is  a  case  study  of  the  development  of  ultra-low 
fertility, based on my own fieldwork in the Italian Alps. Section 5 reviews the evidence 
for reproductive exchange in European societies, and uses it to develop an interpretation 
of the recent reversal of the historical fertility gradient between north western Europe 
and the rest of the continent. Section 6 concludes with some general reflections on the 
relation between exchange theory and other anthropological approaches.  
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2. Anthropological theories of gift exchange and their application to 
kinship  
2.1 Gift exchange  
The anthropological theory of gift exchange was first formulated as such in a celebrated 
essay by Mauss (1990[1924]). Mauss posits three obligations 
 
1.  to give – where there is an existing social relationship; 
2.  to receive – in the same circumstances; and 
3.  to reciprocate – when a gift has been given and accepted. 
 
Mauss  drew  on  ethnographic  and  historical  examples  of  ceremonial  gift  exchange, 
including the potlatch (competitive gift exchange) of societies on the northwest coast of 
north America and (most famously) Malinowski’s (1922) ethnography of the circular 
exchange of kula valuables in an inter-island trading network off eastern New Guinea. 
It  is  worth  looking  a  little  more  closely  at  the  exchange  of  kula  valuables  since 
Malinowski’s account contains the initial description of elements that are implicit or 
explicit in most anthropological accounts of gift exchange. The first of these is that the 
gifts may or may not have a use value (the kula valuables were simply ornaments), but 
they must be expensive in terms of the resources and/or effort required to obtain them, 
and they must matter deeply to the giver as well as to the receiver. It is this kind of gift 
that Mauss’s three rules apply to, and the key point about them is that the appropriate 
and repeated exchange of gifts creates a relationship within which more immediately 
practical transactions can take place. (Readers  familiar  with the recent evolutionary 
literature will be reminded of the theory of costly signalling (Smith 2003).) In the case 
of  kula  trading,  the  formal  process  of  gift  giving  created  a  context  which  made 
pragmatic inter-island trading possible. 
Three  more  points  are  important  about  the  kula  and  characteristic  of  many 
exchange  systems  in  the  anthropological  literature.  The  first  is  that  exchange  is 
competitive: not everyone can get to exchange with an influential partner, and the cost 
of success includes extra effort and expense which not all can afford. The second point 
is  that,  despite  the  individual  strategies  and  competition,  the  kula  is  a  recognised 
institution creating a sense of symbolic and practical community over a well-defined 
geographic area. The third point is a corollary of the other two: namely that each gift is 
a public performance – and a large part of the subjective reward for each giver is public 
acknowledgment that he has played his part well. Although the most famous examples 
of gift exchange in the anthropological literature come from Melanesia,  symbolically 
loaded exchanges are reported from all continents. There is a question, however, of how Heady: Fertility as a process of social exchange  
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far the theory can be applied to European societies. Mauss himself seemed undecided 
on the point, and a number of authors have argued that symbolic exchange has been 
pushed aside by the development of modern capitalism. Others dispute this and Davis 
(1992:79) has argued that symbolic exchange may be just as important in Europe as 
anywhere else – but simply less visible to social scientists working close to home than 
to anthropologists studying non-European societies as outsiders. In this paper I will 
adopt Davis’s point of view. 
 
 
2.2 Young people as gifts  
The  possible  relevance  of  gift  exchange  to  demography  may  become  a  little  more 
apparent when we note that in nearly all known societies the events that demographers 
study – births (or naming ceremonies), marriages and deaths – are accompanied by gifts 
and other symbolically loaded transfers of property.  However, regarding the theory to 
be developed in this paper, the crucial advance was made by Lévi-Strauss (1969 [1949]) 
in  his  well-known  observation  that  the  incest  taboo  means  that  women  (or,  more 
generally, marriage partners of either sex) are exchanged between kin groups. As Lévi-
Strauss  points  out,  this  means  that  young  women  (or  young  people  generally)  are 
themselves the supreme gift – mattering hugely to the givers, vital to the very existence 
of the receiving group and, though Lévi-Strauss didn’t stress this, extremely expensive 
to produce. It follows theoretically, and in fact, that gifts of young women (or young 
people of either sex) in marriage, and the subsequent reciprocation and repetition of the 
gifts  over  future  generations,  are  used  by  their  kin  as  a  way  of  building  social 
relationships and competing for status – and also define fields of social relationships 
(geographic or status groups) within which a level of practical cooperation is expected. 
For Lévi-Strauss, young marriageable adults provide a means of establishing social 
ties – but he treats the existence of these young adults as a given, and doesn’t discuss 
the  value  of  parental  labor  as  such.  However,  while  the  labor  embodied  in  a  child 
reinforces her value as a gift, it is also present in children who are not given away in 
marriage. This suggests a second possible exchange, between parents and children, in 
which the initial parental gift of life and upbringing is returned by the children either as 
later work for their parents, or  by themselves producing offspring who will be the 
grandchildren of the original parents and in some sense continue their identity. This 
second possibility highlights the difference between gift exchange and the exchange of 
goods and services. For the purposes of gift exchange a grandchild can still be a highly 
valued gift for his or her grandparents even if s/he is not likely to render them any 
specific  services.    (The  notion  of  descent  as  exchange  lacks  a  founding  theoretical Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article16 
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statement as clear as that made for affinal
2 exchange by Lévi-Strauss’s comment about 
incest  and  the  exchange  of  women.  However,  the  connection  between  descent  and 
exchange  is  already  implicit  in  the  work  of  Malinowski  (1929:103-110),  and  has 
received further elaboration by Strathern (1988; see also Gell 1999). A number of other 
writers from Dumont (2006 [1971]) to Allen (2000: 75-89) , consider that descent and 
affinal relationships should be analysed as part of a single overall scheme.)  
 
 
2.3 Groups as long-term givers and receivers  
A  very  important  point  about  these  exchanges  of  parental  labour  and  of  marriage 
partners is that individuals are not usually considered as straightforwardly the property 
of other individuals, even of their parents. Individual people belong to groups, and the 
exchanges are considered to take place between these groups. So brides are usually 
given away, and received, by entities such as families, houses, descent groups, age and 
marriage  classes,  and  so  on.  Similarly  the  exchange  of  parental  labour  from  one 
generation to another is not directly returned to the individuals concerned (except in a 
limited  sense  in  the  form  of  care  for  the  elderly).  Instead,  in  a  lineage  society  an 
individual repays what he owes to older members of his decent group by producing new 
members for the group. So when affinal and intergenerational exchange relations bind 
the givers and receivers into an overall system of local solidarity, the units of which this 
system  are  made  are  not  individuals  but  groups  –  usually,  but  not  always,  descent 
groups of some kind.   
Of course, the kin groups concerned are those which form part of the society’s 
existing kinship system. This is a point that is made manifest in many ways – from the 
details of marriages and other life cycle rituals (van Gennep 1981 [1909]), through the 
transfers  of  property  that  accompany  marriage  and  the  succession  of  generations 
(Comaroff 1980; Goody 1976), to the choice of post marital residence (Lévi-Strauss 
1984; Murdock 1949), and the specific terms used to refer to and address particular 
relatives (Morgan 1997 [1870]; Murdock 1949).  Lévi-Strauss's own analysis carried 
this insight further by showing that systems of exchange marriage take specific forms 
that vary from society to society - and that the rules of marriage exchange serve to 
preserve  the  same  pattern  of  relationships  through  time.  This  property  of  self-
perpetuation  is  inherent  in  the  terminology  and  rules  of  the  "elementary"  marriage 
systems that he analyses in Lévi-Strauss 1969 [1949].  
This raises the issue of how widespread is the tendency for the rules of marriage 
exchange to promote system-preservation as such. Does it extend to ‘semi-complex’ 
and ‘complex’ systems where the choice of marriage partner is not positively prescribed 
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in  terms  of  membership  of  specific  existing  kinship  categories?    One  sign  that  the 
answer to this question might be “yes” is the frequent existence of rules or preferences 
for  group  endogamy  -  sometimes  affecting  status  groups  and  sometimes  village 
communities - which tend to preserve the structure of the groups concerned over time. 
These rules suggest a very widespread tendency to conceive of one's own and other 
people's actions from the viewpoint of the system as a whole - and to value actions that 
are, so to speak, system-consistent.    
 
 
2.4 Authority, solidarity and consent  
The  technical  part  of  Levi-Strauss's  analysis  focuses  entirely  on  marriage  systems, 
though he makes it clear that he believes that marriage exchange plays a central role in 
maintaining  the  overall  system  of  social  solidarity,  and  hence  that  differences  in 
marriage systems are causally related to differences in other aspects of the system of 
social exchange.  There is a great deal of ethnographic evidence from the kula onwards 
that exchange systems are related both to the extent of solidarity and to the distribution 
of authority. Reproductive exchange is no exception to this.  A sign of the connection 
between  exchange  and  the  commitment  to  preserving  specific  systems  of  social 
solidarity  is  the  fact  that  societies  often  make  a  sharp  distinction  between  morally 
loaded exchanges, such as those involved in marriages, and transactions in which direct 
gain is the main concern. Parry and Bloch (1989) argue that this distinction is motivated 
by the wish to protect the relationships of power and economic cooperation involved in 
the  long-term  reproduction  of  society  from  the  pressures  arising  from  short-term 
competitive transactions.  
However, it is not enough to talk about wishes in this abstract way. The theme of 
the  first  study  of  the  kind  to  which  Parry  and  Bloch  refer  was  actually  the  partial 
dissolution of such a system that occurred when economic change enabled young men 
to  acquire  brides  directly,  without  going  through  the  system  of  lineage  organised 
exchange  payments  that  underpinned  the  authority  of  the  elders  (Bohannan  1955). 
Systems of reproductive exchange reinforce particular patterns of power and solidarity 
and are likely to be particularly favoured by those who benefit from them, and resisted 
by those who do not.  
This brings us back to the dual nature of affinal and parental relationships. They 
are perceived as symbolic ties that constitute and connect groups in a system of social 
exchange, but they are also actual activities by specific individuals who nearly always 
have a good deal of influence on the decisions involved: whether to have another child, 
whether to get married, whether to organise a marriage for one’s child, or to support or 
hinder the child’s own marriage plans. In making their own decisions, and evaluating Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article16 
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the actions of others, individuals will be influenced by a number of system-consistent 
desires.  The  systems  would  not  work  at  all  if  individual  people  did  not  share  a 
commitment  to  the  basic  values  and  perceptions  underlying  all  exchange  systems: 
specifically that gifts of life (in parenting and marriage) set the scene for a wider set of 
social relationships; that some relationships and some gifts (even of human lives) are 
better than others; that gifts of life should be repaid; and that they should form part of a 
stable system of exchange relationships that can be seen to reproduce itself through 
time. I take these perceptions and attitudes to be universal. 
But the kinds of groups involved in exchange, and the particular ways they are 
networked into larger systems, are not universal and they have specific implications for 
authority and cooperation – about which there is scope for overt and hidden dissent 
within any society.  
When individuals dissent, they may choose to exercise their exchange options (of 
parenting and marriage) in different ways. Or they may choose to withdraw, partly or 
totally, from the system – by not marrying or marrying late, or by not having (so many) 
children.  This  is  one  reason  why  the  exchange  view  of  kinship  has  important 
implications for demography. 
 
 
3. Reproductive exchange and fertility  
In  fact,  the  treatment  of  marriage  and  parenting  as  gifts  of  life  has  a  number  of 
implications for fertility. The first of these is that (in normal circumstances) it sets a 
lower limit below which fertility would not be expected to fall. This is because the 
overall requirement to return gifts – including gifts of human life – means that there 
will be pressure to raise at least as many children to adulthood as was done by previous 
generations.  In  effect,  this  is  a  homeostatic  mechanism  that  will  operate  to  keep 
population up to a certain level. 
There has been a good deal of discussion of homeostatic mechanisms in historical 
demography – and in European societies there is some very convincing quantitative 
data showing  how a   “nuptiality check” appears to have operated as a homeostatic 
mechanism  adjusting  population  to  economic  possibilities  in  pre-industrial  England 
(Wrigley 2003) and over much of the Alps (Netting 1981; Viazzo 1989).  Nuptiality 
checks seem to have been a European speciality, but several authors have argued using 
softer data that functionally equivalent checks have operated in most or all societies 
(Douglas 1966; Lesthaeghe 1980).  However, the concern of these authors has mostly 
been  to  identify  homeostatic  mechanisms  that  keep  fertility  down.  Can  these 
mechanisms  have  anything  to  do  with  a  mechanism  that  operates  in  the  opposite 
direction, to keep fertility up? Heady: Fertility as a process of social exchange  
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I  would  argue  that  they  can,  since  the  previous  discussion  has  shown  that 
reproductive exchange operates as part of a  system  whose overall tendency  is self-
replication. Replicating the relationships of people to resources is as much part of this 
as replicating the relationships of people with each other. So one would expect such a 
system  to  include  requirements  to  combine  the  replication  of  population  with  the 
replication of wealth. In fact, the competition for status means that gift exchange has a 
certain expansive tendency, since individuals and groups can enhance their status by 
passing on more than they received – whether in material terms or in terms of human 
lives. This can be thought of as a ratchet effect, in which the tendency will be at least to 
reproduce the population numbers and wealth per capita of previous generations but, 
where medical or economic progress permit, to increase either population, or per capita 
wealth,  or  both.  This  would  then  set  a  new  standard  which  subsequent  generations 
would try to reproduce or exceed. At any given time, the need to reproduce the level of 
per capita wealth would set an upper homeostatic limit to the expansion of population, 
and vice versa.  
This  is  not  incompatible  with  Becker’s  account  of  the  economic  motives  for 
parenthood,  which  include  both  the  balance  of  costs  and  benefits  for  the  parents 
themselves, and the economic welfare of their children and their children’s descendents. 
He claims that potential parents aim to maximise their ‘dynastic’ utility – by which he 
means  a  combination  of  the  number  of  descendents  and  their  average  levels  of 
economic consumption, discounted over time (Becker 1993:155-178).  He argues that 
in modern economies, where there are high returns to education, and continuation in 
education imposes substantial costs on the parents, this function will be optimised at a 
lower fertility level than in earlier economies where the returns to investment in human 
capital were lower.      
However, our account would modify Becker’s analysis in two ways. The first is 
that this maximisation is constrained between the homeostatic limits. The second is 
that, because exchanges of life create moral obligations with practical effects, it may 
make  sense  in  some  kinship  systems  to  see  children  as  assets  whose  disposal  in 
marriage will create social capital for the parents. In such systems, any free play left by 
the homeostatic limits could be used to produce either additional children or additional 
wealth.  However,  in  a  system  in  which  parents  did  not  control  their  children’s 
marriages, the incentive to produce additional children would be weaker, and hence the 
relative attraction of investments in physical or monetary wealth would be greater.  
Caldwell’s  (1976,  2005)  analysis  of  net  intergenerational  wealth  flows  takes 
account of the immediate and delayed costs and benefits that accrue to parents in their 
direct interactions with their children, and also of potential political benefits from future 
marriage alliances. So the last two paragraphs show that reproductive exchange theory 
is  also  compatible  with  Caldwell’s  analysis,  provided  that  the  effects  of Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article16 
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intergenerational wealth flows are restricted to fertility choices that remain within the 
homeostatic limits. Caldwell himself also believes that the impact of intergenerational 
wealth flows is subject to some kind of limits. Although he doesn’t define these very 
precisely, he says that the effects of selfishly rational parental choice are limited by 
“social, psychological and physiological” factors which ensure that fertility neither falls 
so low, nor rises so high, as it would if parental economic rationality were its only 
determinant (Caldwell 1976: 355). Reproductive exchange theory makes it possible to 
be more definite about this. As noted above, the distance between the upper and lower 
homeostatic  bounds  depends  on  the  rate  of  progress  of  productive  and  medical 
technology. Where this progress is particularly rapid – for instance in societies which 
are  assimilating  advanced  technologies  developed  elsewhere  –  the  range  of  fertility 
rates  that  are  compatible  with  the  principles  of  reproductive  exchange  will  be 
particularly wide. It is in these societies that the direction and size of intergenerational 
wealth flows would be expected to have most impact on fertility.  
Up to this point I have implicitly assumed that the local system of reproductive 
exchange remains in place, and shown that its effect would be to set homeostatic limits, 
of  varying  widths,  to  the  impact  of  economic  incentives.  However,  reproductive 
exchange theory also suggests a quite different way in which economic choices may 
influence fertility. As we noted at the end of Section 2, there is one potential exception 
to the principle that treating marriage and parenthood as gift exchanges must maintain 
fertility.  This arises because the gifts of life also express and maintain existing systems 
of  cooperation  and  authority.    If  exogenous  economic  developments  provide  new 
possibilities of cooperative relationships and authority roles, they simultaneously call 
into question the existing pattern of reproductive exchange.  As people start to take 
advantage  of    the  new  possibilities,  and  therefore  disengage  from  previous  ties  of 
cooperation and authority, they will wish to use the symbolic power of marriage and 
parenthood  to  reinforce  their  new  practical  relationships.  But  this  may  not  be  easy 
because, as we have seen, personal strategies of reproductive exchange acquire their 
meaning and motivating force as parts of a stable, self-reciprocating system – and there 
is nothing to guarantee that an integrated new system of practical and reproductive 
exchange will quickly take the place of the old, and no longer sustainable, version. 
Unable or unwilling to understand their parenthood as a contribution to the old system, 
but lacking any alternative symbolic framework to give it a larger purpose, potential 
parents would respond by cutting back their fertility. 
Since this may seem both abstract and counter-intuitive , it is worth noting that the 
scenario just outlined is actually quite similar to that described by the theory of the 
“second demographic transition” (SDT) (Lesthaeghe 1983
3; Lesthaeghe and Neidert 
2006). This is grounded in a wider tradition of sociological modernisation theory which 
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proposes that modern economies reward individual initiative, while growing prosperity 
provides people with the opportunity to focus on higher order goals of self-realisation. 
There  is  very  strong  evidence  from  comparative  survey  data  that  this  leads  to  the 
development of more individualistic value orientations (Inglehart  and Welzel 2005). 
The SDT theorists take the argument one step further and equate this with a rejection of 
social obligations as such – including the obligation to form traditional marriage ties 
and the physical business of reproduction. So SDT theory, like reproductive exchange 
theory,  would  predict  that  the  breakdown  of  traditional  patterns  of  economic 
cooperation would lead to a fall in fertility. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  two  crucial  differences.  First:  where  the  SDT  theorists 
associate falls in fertility  with a one-way process of increasing self-determination, I 
associate  them  with  the  transition  from  one  system  of  cooperative  relationships  to 
another. And second: where the SDT theorists think in terms of a contrast between self-
regulation and the fulfilment of obligations, I have been arguing that some obligations – 
to return the gift of life, to perpetuate a system of relationships one believes in, and to 
encourage others to do the same – are in fact inclinations. From this point of view, there 
is no reason to suppose that an increase in values of self-determination (which seems to 
be very well attested) should lead to a long-term rejection of parenthood. Unlike the 
SDT  theorists,  who  are  inclined  to  think  that  European  fertility  levels  will  remain 
permanently below replacement level (Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999), I would predict 
that – after a more or less prolonged search for new ways of combining reproductive 
exchange with the increased economic and social emphasis on self-determination – a 
new system of practical cooperation and  reproductive exchange will emerge, which 
permits a return to replacement fertility.  
After these preliminaries it is now time to turn to the case study. 
 
 
4. Case study of the development of ultra-low fertility  
4.1 Introduction  
The area covered by this case study consists of a number of villages in a valley in 
Carnia – an area of the eastern Italian Alps, where I carried out fieldwork between 1989 
and  1991.  The  thought  that  fertility  might  somehow  relate  to  patterns  of  social 
relationships arose from that experience. The birth rate was extremely low, the ratio of 
children to women of child-bearing age being about 1 - only half the number needed for 
the natural reproduction of the population. In contrast, the proportion of elderly people 
in the population was high, due to migration from the valley during recent decades, 
which had particularly affected the age-groups who would, if they had stayed, have Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article16 
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been aged between 40 and 60. People often lamented to me that deaths were far more 
frequent than births. 
What  struck  me,  however,  was  that  these  complaints  formed  part  of  a  general 
litany which included the physical deterioration (as local people saw it) of the landscape 
as a result of the advance of the woods over land that had previously been kept clear for 
use as hayfields and meadows. It also included a lament that the tenor of social life had 
changed. People, so I was told, had become selfish, and no longer lent each other a 
hand. Life was also less fun now. Though people used to be much less well-off, there 
had been far more allegria – joyful togetherness – in the old days. The people I spoke to 
never  specified  a  causal  link  between  fertility  and  the  other  economic  and  social 
changes,  but  the  fact  that  they  wove  them  together  in  their  narratives  of  decline 
suggested that they were somehow connected – and implicitly posed the question of 
what the connection might be. 
The purpose of this section is to investigate how well the reproductive exchange 
model,  and  other  approaches,  fit  this  Carnian  case.  The  available  data  includes 
quantitative  information  on  fertility  and  on  spatial  marriage  patterns,  as  well  as 
quantitative and qualitative data on changing patterns of economic life.
4 My proposed 
research topic was “local identity and ritual” and I made a particular study of certain 
rituals and associated symbolic themes. I will also draw on the impressions I gathered 
from  informal  conversations  about  the  declining  birth  rate,  and  the  factors  that 
influenced the desired number of children. On the other hand I do not have systematic 
interview  data  on  family  formation  strategies,  or  about  the  economic  situation  of 
specific families. Thus I do not have the kind of data that are generally used for testing 
economic theories. In that sense, it could be argued that this case study is biased in 
favor  of  non-economic  interpretations.  However,  I  will  do  my  best  to  relate  the 
available data to economic explanations directly involving flows of goods and services, 
as well as to the social exchange model developed in this paper. I will also look at the 
implications of the data for SDT theory  
 
 
4.2 Background and trends  
For several centuries the Carnian economy had been based on a combination of small-
scale  agriculture  and  livestock  raising,  forestry  and  seasonal  emigration.  Almost  all 
village families were involved in agriculture to some degree. Although people mainly 
worked their own land on their own account, the agricultural economy was dependent 
on cooperative work by village families – in keeping the paths to the upper meadows 
and pastures clear, in clearing snow in winter, in running collectively owned dairies, as 
                                                            
4 The quantitative data are summarised here. Details are given in (Heady 1999). Heady: Fertility as a process of social exchange  
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well as – in some villages – collectively owned woods and pastures. In all this, the 
cooperative unit was the village community. 
As in most alpine communities, fertility in earlier centuries was at the relatively 
low levels typical of northwest Europe, though much higher of course than in European 
societies today (Breschi et al. 1999). Most marriages took place between people born in 
the same multi-village commune and, in the upper villages, a substantial proportion of 
marriages were between co-villagers. 
After  the  second  world  war  the  traditional  economy  based  on  agriculture  and 
seasonal emigration went into a decline which, though gradual at first, reached a kind of 
tipping point about 1970, when the cooperative dairies were closed, people stopped 
maintaining the paths to the upper pastures, and seasonal emigration came to an end. 
The decline of the traditional economy did not mean that the local people themselves 
became  poorer.  In  the  decades  after  the  second  world  war  about  40  percent  of  the 
population left permanently,  but the remainder saw their  incomes rise  substantially, 
roughly in line with the increase of earnings that took place in Italy as a whole. Factory 
and office work played an important role, though many men have continued to work 
outdoors  as  lumberjacks  and  construction  workers.  On  the  other  hand,  employment 
opportunities for women remained very limited.   
The typical length of schooling, which had been very short until the early 1960s, 
increased  rapidly  after  that.  Transport  also  improved  rapidly  with  the  spread  of 
motorcycle and then car ownership, and improvement in the quality of the roads. 
At  the  same  time  the  geographical  range  of  the  marriage  network  started  to 
increase. The proportion marrying partners from the same commune declined and the 
attitude to marrying partners from the same village changed dramatically. Formerly the 
socially approved option, same-village marriage came to be regarded by young people 
as  unacceptably  close.  In  the  village  which  I  studied  most  intensely,  same-village 
marriages were frequent until about the time the dairy closed, and then stopped almost 
completely. 
Through all this the birth rate declined steadily to reach the exceptionally low level 
that applied in the 1980s. 
 
 
4.3 The traditional exchange system  
It is now time to consider the traditional social and symbolic framework within which 
local  people  made  their  decisions  about  marriage  and  parenthood.  Carnian  village 
communities are composed not just of people but of houses, which are both physical 
and social entities.  As buildings they are large, often containing accommodation for 
more than one nuclear-family unit. But cjasa, the word for "house" in the local speech, Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article16 
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also means "family".  Each village house has a name,  often that of an ancestor of the 
present inhabitants, which can also be used to refer to the members of the patrilineal 
extended family who live in it. Houses are felt to embody the self-sacrificing work of 
previous generations (including the in-marrying wives). Self-sacrificing work on behalf 
of their children is the basis of the rhetorical claims made by older people for authority 
within the family. The implicit exchange relationship was particularly stressed in the 
case of sons: until recently, houses were inherited exclusively by sons because they, 
unlike daughters, were felt to carry on the family line. If a family only had daughters 
then one of them might marry an outsider, who came to live in her parental home. But 
this arrangement was seen as extremely humiliating and the in-marrying husband was 
said to have married like a cuckoo. This was because home ownership, and the correct 
relationship  to  previous  ancestor-owners,  conveyed  the  authority  over  other  cjasa 
members which was part of the senior male role.    
A  correct  relationship  to  houses  was  a  precondition  for  socially  acceptable 
marriage and fertility. Births outside marriage were and still are rare. However, when 
they did occur, the custom early in the twentieth century was that the official family 
name of the child would be chosen by the local registrar. The practice was to assign 
them names referring to plants - thus indicating that the birth was metaphorically out of 
doors, excluded from the morally approved world of family houses. It is possible to 
take this analysis one stage further, and trace a set of ideas that link houses, social 
competition and physical fertility. Envy was believed to have the potential to directly 
harm the envied person, by means of such mechanisms as the evil eye. Mothers and 
children were thought to be particularly subject to dangerous envy from other women. 
Houses  offered  protection  against  this  danger,  because  their  walls  blocked  visual 
communication. In this way they made the good fortune of those inside the house less 
provocative  to  potentially  envious  outsiders,  and  also  blocked  the  transmission  of 
dangerous  ill  wishes  by  the  evil  eye.  Given  these  conventions  and  beliefs,  proper 
housing could be seen as a moral and physical requirement of reproduction.  
Although these beliefs seem to be fading, the importance of the physical cjasa as a 
sign of the family’s position in the community is a constant of local culture – and the 
possession  of  decent  accommodation  is  still,  as  it  would  have  been  in  the  past, 
important for a family’s status. Nowadays this accommodation sometimes consists of a 
couple’s own house, and that would always have been a particularly high-status option 
for young people starting out on married life. But even nowadays it is just as common 
for  a  couple  to  occupy  part  of  a  larger  house,  usually  shared  with  the  husband’s 
relatives. The crucial point is that fitting in another reproductive couple would always 
have meant either accepting more cramped conditions, with their implications for status 
as well as convenience – or the trouble and expense of new building. And this would Heady: Fertility as a process of social exchange  
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have provided a brake on the formation of new marriages, and hence on the expansion 
of the local population.  
Turning now to the community as a whole: there is a strong feeling that the people 
of each village should ideally be united;  this is accompanied by a strong sense of 
rivalry between neighbouring villages; and there was until recently an ideal of village 
endogamy. Within the village community the model of marriage was one in which the 
particular families connected changed from generation to generation - so that marriage 
links tied each lineage to the community as a whole, rather than to a narrower set of 
exchange  partners.  This  structure  corresponded  to  the  local  pattern  of  economic 
exchange - in as much as the main ties of practical cooperation were also at village 
level, and many of them required cooperative action by the village as a whole. 
This self-reproducing system of kinship and economic cooperation was not just an 
observer's  model,  but  one  which  local  people  were  conscious  of  and  deliberately 
promoted. I remember talking to friends about a village in which the young people were 
believed  to  spend  a  lot  of  time  in  each  other's  company.  They  remarked  that  this 
augured well for the future of that village. This sense of continuity as an explicit value, 
and the role of young people in promoting it, is embodied in an annual ritual which I 
have described elsewhere (Heady 1999, 2003).  This ritual, known as the cidulas  (i.e. 
disks  -  because  its  central  episode  involved  the  throwing  of  burning  disks  from  a 
hillside above the village) set up an opposition between young adults on the one hand 
and householders on the other. It represented courtship as taking place between partners 
from the same village, but asserted that the process was under the control of the young 
people themselves, not of their elders. However this opposition between the generations 
was presented  within a  wider framework of reciprocal exchange, in  which the new 
couples resulting from the courtship would continue the life of the village as a whole.   
This ritual was seen as the most important of three annual events which involved 
the idea of village unity. The other two were sops, a ritual in which every household 
gave  a  small  present  to  all  of  the  village  children,  and  rogatsion,  in  which  the 
community as a whole circled the village fields. All these rituals express a conception 
of the village as a continuing reproductive and agricultural unit. The sops, and still more 
the  cidulas,  go  beyond  this  to  express  in  imagery  the  principles  of  reproductive 
exchange  on which the system was founded.    
 
 
4.4 Changing attitudes to parenthood and marriage  
My  direct  conversations  about  reasons  underlying  desired  family  sizes  were  mostly 
with middle-aged and younger people. I was aware from other conversations, and from 
data that I collected on living arrangements, that the duty to care for one’s parents in old Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article16 
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age is generally accepted, and I often saw adolescent and adult children helping their 
middle-aged and elderly parents with the much reduced agricultural activities that many 
families still undertake. So it would not be unreasonable if parents were to take account 
of future help from their children when planning their families.   
Everyone was aware that both the cost in time and money of raising children, and 
the amount of help that parents could expect in return, had changed radically in recent 
decades. As well as the longer school attendance – now typically well above the legal 
minimum  –  parents  in  1990  provided  their  children  with  a  higher  material  living 
standard  and  spent  a  good  deal  of  time  ferrying  them  between  various  recreational 
activities. Children were much less strictly disciplined than they had been before, and 
the continuing authority of parents over their adult children, which had been a feature of 
life earlier in the century, was now a thing of the past.  
Parents  clearly  were  behaving  partly  in  the  way  that  Becker  would  predict: 
providing the support necessary for their children to acquire the education needed for 
success  in  the  modern  economy.  But  was  this  the  whole  reason  for  the  decline  in 
fertility? The way people talked about the choice of family size did not suggest that 
they were consciously calculating the different levels of benefit (for themselves and 
their children) that could be obtained from different combinations of family size and 
education  level.  Instead  they  talked  of  needing  to  meet  the  obligations  of  modern 
parenthood – in terms of support during education and of general well-being. If these 
conversations were taken at face value, parents would seem to have been balancing 
their desire for children against the effort and cost that would be involved in giving 
those children a socially acceptable life style.  
However, there was something about these conversations that didn’t quite fit. If 
costs had risen, incomes too were now much higher; and although mothers complained 
about the amount of time and energy required to look after children in the modern style, 
they were not in fact very short of time – since paid employment for women had not 
increased  to  match  the  decline  in  the  amount  of  time  committed  to  agricultural 
activities. In other contexts, women complained of having too little to do. If the expense 
and difficulty of meeting social standards of respectable parenthood were really the 
only factor restraining parents' enthusiasm for having children, one would expect them 
to use all the time and resources they could spare. The fact, that they did not do so, 
suggests  that  their  enthusiasm  for  parenthood  was  already  low,  and  that  they 
experienced the work of parenting more as a matter of drudgery than as a fulfilment.  
This basic lack of enthusiasm for parenthood as such has more in common with the 
self-centred attitudes that advocates of SDT theory  would expect to accompany the 
increased prosperity that Carnians have experienced in recent decades. But here too the 
facts don’t quite fit. If parenthood was being cut back on in order to make way for the 
pursuit of self-fulfilment, one would have expected young and middle aged adults to be Heady: Fertility as a process of social exchange  
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actively engaged in new forms of self-fulfilment. However, as just indicated, there was 
little sign of this kind of engagement.     
The  idea  of  a  simultaneous  diffusion  of  new  economic  opportunities  and  a 
different model of parenthood, implicitly raised a few paragraphs back, is in fact rather 
misleading. The new norms of parent-child relations did not exist before the diffusion 
of the economic changes in the second half of the twentieth century. They developed 
during the process of economic change, and were as new elsewhere in Italy as they 
were in Carnia. The normative changes are therefore better analysed as the product of 
social processes which arose in situ as a result of the new economic opportunities. One 
way of interpreting what happened would be to say that parents initially behaved as 
rational dynastic strategists, by giving their children the education that they believed 
would optimize their future earning possibilities – but then found that they had to adapt 
their parenting style to one that would maintain good relations with educated children 
who would not, as adults, be economically dependent on the family estate.   
The second step, like the first, was rational. But it was not made willingly. In 1990 
elderly  people  and  people  in  later  middle  age  openly  expressed  their  anger  at  the 
independent  minded  and  uncooperative  behaviour  of  young  people  –  which  they 
attributed to the new found  economic prosperity and the fact that  young people no 
longer  depended  on  the  help  of  their  elders  and  neighbours  for  their  economic 
subsistence. Younger people, on the whole, were respectful in their comments on their 
elders, while nevertheless indicating a certain detachment from the attitudes and values 
of the older generation.  
Elderly people were also perplexed by the change that had taken place in marriage 
patterns.  As  we  have  seen,  the  decline  of  the  old  agricultural  economy  was 
accompanied by a geographical widening of the choice of marriage partners, meaning 
that marriages no longer reinforced ties within the village community but were now 
being used to build social and symbolic connections over a wider social field. One 
manifestation of this change was the fate of the cidulas ritual. In several villages it was 
toned down, and in some it was temporarily abandoned because the young people (who 
took the active roles in the ceremony) felt that it was out-of-line with modern life, and 
rather embarrassing. However they soon started again, as a result of pressure from the 
older members of the community. This festival of youth and courtship was important to 
them, even a generation or more after they themselves had passed through that phase of 
life  –  showing  clearly  the  emotional  satisfaction  they  derived  from    a  ritual  that 
represented  the  idea  that  their  children’s  marriages  would    continue  the  pattern  of 
affinal exchanges in which they themselves had taken part.  
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4.5 Discussion of the case study  
In order to explain the basic lack of enthusiasm for parenthood that prevailed around 
1990, it may be helpful to summarise the changes that had occurred during the previous 
30 years or so. Over this period village life had changed fundamentally. In 1960 the 
symbolic  mechanisms  that  set  the  upper  and  lower  limits  to  a  homeostatic  fertility 
system  were  both  in  place.  What  is  more,  the  patterns  of  residence  and  collective 
celebrations of agriculture, parenthood and affinity – the central elements of the system 
of reproductive exchange – expressed relationships of intra-lineage authority, and inter-
lineage  cooperation  within  the  village,  which  broadly  corresponded  to  the  way  the 
social and economic system actually worked. In 1990 the patterns of residence and the 
symbolism  of  household  and  community,  though  slightly  modified,  were  still 
substantially in place. However, the actual economic relationships, as well as the actual 
patterns of marriage and of intra-household authority, were quite different.  
In the former situation a man who married and had children could expect approval 
because he was carrying forward the identities of his cjasa and his village. A woman 
who  married and had children  would receive approval for helping to reproduce the 
cjasa and village of her husband. If both partners were from the same village, they 
would also receive approval for perpetuating the ties that united village families. They 
would have welcomed this approval in an uncomplicated way, since it was coming from 
the kinship group and community with which they expected to cooperate closely over 
their whole lives, and with which their personal hopes and ambitions were therefore 
involved. This consciousness of the approval of the people who mattered to them must 
have provided young adults with an incentive for marriage and parenthood, or at least a 
positive emotional basis from which to face the difficulties involved. As such, it must 
have favoured fertility.  
In the new situation this was no longer the case. The symbolism still suggested that 
marriage  and  parenthood  would  perpetuate  the  cjasa  and  village,  and  so  potential 
parents could expect some approval from the older members of both institutions. The 
problem was that, since the connections that mattered to younger adults now lay largely 
outside the cjasa and the village, they no longer cared so much – and so the approval of 
parents  and  fellow  villagers  provided  less  of  an  incentive  for  fertility.  Indeed,  if 
anything, young adults wanted to loosen connections with their village communities, 
and their own strong preference for exogamous marriages was in part an expression of 
this. The hostility of the older generation towards the changed attitudes of the young 
must  also  have  reinforced  the  tendency  of  the  latter  to  distance  themselves 
psychologically from community ties. 
So  public  approval  for  perpetuating  the  old  institutions  of  kinship  and  village 
solidarity  had  lost  its  value  as  an  incentive  towards  marriage  and  parenthood.  The 
deeper problem was that nothing equivalent had taken its place. The very persistence of Heady: Fertility as a process of social exchange  
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the  symbolism  of  sops  and  cidulas  suggests  a  nostalgia  for  the  idea  of  a  self-
reproducing community – and simultaneously demonstrates that local people had not 
yet succeeded in creating an alternative system of reproductive exchange that would be 
compatible with the looser and more dispersed ties on which their practical lives were 
now based. 
Thus  an  explanatory  strategy  that  combines  rational  economic  choice  with 
attention  to  the  implications  for  inter-personal  relationships  and  the  symbolism  of 
reproductive  exchange  seems  to  me  to  provide  a  persuasive  explanation  for  the 
demographic changes that occurred in Carnia between 1960 and 1990. It is not the only 
possible explanation, since the decline in fertility could also be seen as a direct response 
to the changed balance of current costs and long-term benefits involved in child-rearing, 
on the part of parents who were investing rationally in future family-based care for their 
old age. While the explanation suggested here is less parsimonious it does have the 
advantage of accounting for a wider range of ethnographic data. Further comparisons 
between the explanatory power of reproductive exchange and other theories are given in 
the next section. 
 
 
5. Reproductive exchange systems, economic change and fertility in 
Europe as a whole  
5.1 Reproductive exchange systems and their economic context  
Though  Lévi-Strauss  himself  intended  his  basic  argument  to  be  universal,  many 
anthropologists  would  doubt  the  applicability  of  reproductive  exchange  theory  to 
modern  Europe  –  arguing  that  in  contemporary  and  recent  European  societies 
households and married couples should be seen as autonomous units rather than as parts 
of a wider kinship system (Brettell 1991; Goody 1983).  In making a case for extending 
the application of reproductive exchange theory beyond the Carnian example, I shall be 
making two different kinds of claim. The first claim – for which I will argue in the next 
few paragraphs – is that local communities with reproductive exchange systems and 
norms of practical cooperation very like those of Carnia, and broadly similar to those 
described  by  numerous  ethnographic  studies  of  non-European  societies,  were 
characteristic of many areas of rural Europe until very recently indeed. The second kind 
of  claim  –  which  I  will  develop  after  that  –  is  that  the  principles  of  reproductive 
exchange continue to influence fertility even in societies in which affinal ties are not 
closely aligned with local geographic communities. As a preliminary to this argument, 
the next few paragraphs will also point to evidence that there are some parts of Europe Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article16 
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in which descent groups and endogamous cooperative local communities have not been 
socially important for several centuries.   
The  aspect  of  reproductive  exchange  theory  whose  applicability  to  Europe  has 
probably been most widely recognised  is the idea of a duty to have children in order to 
continue one’s family of origin. Le Bras has argued (1997: 32) that “self perpetuation 
was the central concern of the traditional European family”, and analyzed the differing 
fertility rates in contemporary Europe as consequences of the tensions that arise during 
the  decay  of  traditional  family  models.  However,  there  was  a  major  difference  in 
traditional  family  systems  between  northwestern  Europe,  where  the  predominant 
custom  before  the  demographic  transition  was  for  new  couples  to  form  distinct 
households,  and  the  rest  of  the  continent,  where  they  would  generally  join  the 
household of the parents of one or other spouse (Hajnal 1983). Further research has 
inevitably  complicated  the  simple  distinction  drawn  by  Hajnal  –  in  particular  by 
showing that neo-local residence was also the predominant pattern in some parts of 
southern Europe.  However, in an article which reviewed the historical research to date 
and combined it with contemporary statistical data, Reher (1998) has reaffirmed the 
validity of the original macro-regional distinction, and shown that a similar north-south 
distinction still exists between what he calls strong and weak families – as measured in 
terms of residence patterns and other indicators of contact and cooperation between 
close relatives. In this connection, he and Micheli (2000) have pointed out that the 
nuclear family households of Mediterranean Europe are much more tightly integrated 
into  networks  of  close  kin  than  are  those  of  northwest  Europe.    Heady  (2005)  has 
pointed out that these continuing geographic distinctions broadly coincide with long-
standing differences in the emphasis placed on marriage and descent ties in kinship 
terminologies. Mitterauer (2003) traces the difference in household patterns back to the 
organisation  of  feudal  society  in  the  middle  ages,  and  argues  that  the  northwest 
European pattern was connected with the development of market relationships and the 
need for labour mobility. 
Although  no  European  societies  conform  to  the  extreme  forms  of  restricted 
exchange-marriage discussed by Lévi-Strauss, such as the direct exchange of women 
between  descent  groups,  there  are  examples  of  marriage  patterns  that  involve 
reciprocity within limited groups of related families (Delille1988; Segalen 1991: 88-
123).  Roughly  speaking  the  idea  is  that  family  A  gives  a  daughter  in  marriage  to 
another family in the group (say family B), but receives a bride from a different family 
C which is also in the group. In each generation the particular families involved differ, 
but  exchanges  remain  concentrated  within  the  same  set.  This  set  might  be  defined 
purely in kinship terms or, as in the Carnian case, it  might coincide  with a village 
community.  In  the  latter  situation  the  normative  association  with  generalized  social 
solidarity is particularly clear. In Italy campanilismo - village patriotism and rivalry Heady: Fertility as a process of social exchange  
484    http://www.demographic-research.org  
with other villages - is or used to be a prominent value system (albeit one that is often 
viewed critically by those involved). There is also a well-known saying mogli e buoi di 
paesi tuoi ("wives and oxen of your own villages") implying that one ought to marry 
someone  from  the  same  village.  So,  at  the  level  of  mental  models  at  least,  the 
emphasized community of moral solidarity coincides with the field of approved affinal 
ties.  
Italy is not alone in this. In detailed studies of Greek communities Loizos (1975: 
94-102) and Just (2000) have shown how the practice of endogamous marriage is seen 
as the foundation of the village’s sense of moral community. Heady (2003) points to 
rituals  celebrating  endogamous  marriage  in  cooperative  village  communities  across 
southern Europe from Portugal to Romania. Layton (2003) also notes the correlation 
between dense networks of affinal ties and cooperative village enterprise. However, the 
evidence applies to southern and eastern Europe only. Such communities do not appear 
to  have  operated  much  in  north  western  Europe.  This  point  is  consistent  with  the 
historical traditions of greater spatial mobility and weaker intergenerational ties in  that 
part of the continent, which were a feature of the early forms of capitalist development 
discussed by Mitterauer.    
These reproductive institutions have been undergoing change for some time. As 
the economic and social conditions that prevailed in Carnia before 1970 were fairly 
widespread in the village communities of southern Europe in the mid-twentieth century, 
it is possible that similar development paths were followed in a number of regions. 
Indeed Solinas and Grilli (2002) report a similar geographic expansion of  marriage 
networks in central Italy. It is also likely that the consequences of migration from the 
countryside into the cities and suburbs during the second half of the twentieth century 
would have disrupted existing exchange and cooperative relationships, and widened the 
social range of marriage networks, at least as much as the changes taking place in the 
countryside itself.  
Changes  are  also  taking  place  in  the  composition  and  stability  of  reproductive 
households. In many parts of Europe, but particularly strongly in the north and west, 
there are signs of  much  more flexible arrangements developing,  with easier partner 
change, and a tendency to opt out of, or postpone, the wedding celebrations that ritually 
assign the new couple their place in the system of reproductive exchange. Residence in 
the new informal households is associated both with economic changes and with the 
value shifts that accompany modernisation: it is associated with high levels of labour 
market participation by women (Le Bras 1997), and with values that stress individual 
self-determination  (Surkyn  and  Lesthaeghe  2004).    Cohabitation  appears  to  provide 
young  women  with  the  opportunity  of  pursuing  their  education  and  establishing 
themselves  in  a  career  before  committing  themselves  to  motherhood,  and  is  also 
associated with a more equal allocation of domestic roles than is the case in married Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article16 
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couples (de Singly and Ciccheli 2003:338). Consistently with this, there is evidence 
from American research that the stress caused by unequal division of domestic tasks 
within married couples is greatest for women who participate actively in the labour 
market  and  least  for  women  with  a  “traditional”  view  of  gender  roles  (Piña  and 
Bengtson 1993).    
Several  writers  have  suggested  that  the  increased  instability  of  reproductive 
couples, together with the continuing rise in longevity, may be leading to an increased 
role  for  grand-parents  in  the  process  of  child-rearing  –  along  with  a  general 
strengthening of intergenerational ties – both in Europe and north America (Bengtson 
2001; Segalen 2003).  However, some caution is in order here. While both of  the 
authors just mentioned cite evidence of the current strength of intergenerational ties, 
quantitative research on this theme is relatively new – and the data does not yet have 
enough time depth to show whether the strength of intergenerational relationships is 
actually increasing (Bengtson 2001:13). Another interpretation, which would fit better 
with the reproductive exchange hypothesis
5, is that there have always been supportive 
relationships between successive reproductive generations – even if these have been 
stronger in regions where successive  generations live with, or close to, each other than 
in areas where this is not the case. 
 
 
5.2 Exchange and fertility  
Summarising  this  material  it  seems  possible  to  glimpse  the  outline  of  three  broad 
systems of reproductive exchange in contemporary Europe:  
 
1.  a  traditional  southern  and  eastern  system  in  which  localised  descent 
groups  (often  but  not  always  identified  with  houses)  form  local 
communities whose solidarity is reinforced by frequent marriage ties; the 
gift relationships are between generations within the descent groups, and 
between descent groups within the community. 
2.  a traditional north western system in which married couples form –  with 
the authorisation of church, state, and relatives – and bring up children 
who  leave  home  to  form  their  own  married  couples  under  the  same 
conditions; each couple thus gives its children to the community at large, 
and  receives  partners  for  them  from  the  community  at  large;  the  gift 
                                                            
5This is partly because reproductive exchange implies relations of solidarity, and couples in successive 
generations are linked to some extent by reproductive exchange, even in systems with neo-local residence. A 
further reason for scepticism about increasing intergenerational solidarity is the argument developed in the 
case study, and in this section, that recent economic trends favour looser intergenerational ties.    Heady: Fertility as a process of social exchange  
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relationships  are  therefore  both  between  successive  generations  of 
married couples and between each couple and the community at large; the 
community that is thus tied together is much wider than a local village, 
and might be conceived of by those involved in various ways – related 
perhaps to social class, religion or nationality.  
3.  an emergent system in  which the reproductive  units are freely  formed 
egalitarian  couples  –  who  reject  the  need  for  anyone  else  –  whether 
church, state, or kin – to authorise their relationship; because the system 
is new it is not entirely clear how intergenerational links will form, but in 
principle  exchanges  between  different  generations  of  couples,  and 
between the couple and the community at large, could be very similar to 
those under system 2 – the difference being a new level of independence 
for younger parents. 
 
As young people everywhere in Europe are now faced with similar demands and 
opportunities  from  the  modern  economy  –  and  system  3  expresses  values  that  are 
strongly associated with economic modernity – it is unsurprising that it is making some 
gains in all parts of Europe. However, since the jump from system 2 to system 3 is 
smaller than that from system 1 to system 3 (or even from system 1 to system 2) it is 
equally unsurprising that system 3 is growing faster in north western countries than 
elsewhere in Europe. The result, however, is that the tension between the demands of 
the  modern  economy  and  the  demands  of  the  prevailing  systems  of  reproductive 
exchange is highest in the system 1 countries in southern and eastern Europe, a good 
deal less in system 2 countries, and lowest of all in those north western countries where 
system 3 has in effect already become a legitimate alternative to system 2. 
This  situation  offers  us  a  chance  to  compare  the  demographic  implications  of 
reproductive exchange theory with the predictions of SDT theory. The SDT view is that 
the spread of the individualistic values embodied in what I have called system 3 will 
lead to permanently lower fertility – and so fertility should be lowest where these values 
are most widespread, and highest in the strong family context of system 1 – i.e. lowest 
in the northwest and highest in the south and east. The reproductive exchange view, 
developed in section 3, and illustrated by the Carnian case study, is that fertility will fall 
when the economy leads young people to develop economic relationships and value 
commitments  which  are  at  odds  with  those  supported  by  the  symbolism  of  the 
prevailing system of reproductive gift exchange. On this view fertility should be lowest 
where the discrepancy is greatest – i.e. lowest in the south and east and highest in the 
northwest.  Currently  the  statistical  data  favour  the  reproductive  exchange  view  as 
fertility  is  now  highest  in  northwest  Europe,  being  negatively  correlated  with  the 
strength of family ties and positively correlated with the frequency of informal unions Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article16 
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(Dalla Zuanna 2001). Dalla Zuanna’s results, which are based on national figures, are 
reinforced by Micheli’s (2000) finding that in France, Spain and Italy,  fertility at the 
end of the 20
th century was lowest in those regions which, like Carnia, were historically 
characterised by three-generation households.  
The statistical data also provide valuable checks of alternative explanations based 
on direct economic incentives. The possibility, floated at the end of section 4, that the 
decline in Carnian birth rates might be a consequence of rational investment in family-
based care for one’s old age, is not confirmed by the comparative statistical data, since 
the countries which now have the highest fertility have the weakest intergenerational 
ties.  However,  an  incentive-based  argument  within  the  reproductive  exchange 
framework  could  help  to  explain  the  fact  that,  before  the  demographic  transition, 
fertility in northwest Europe was lower than in the rest of the continent (Coale and 
Treadway 1986). It is clear that the prospects of using parenthood to build social capital 
would have been less favourable in system 2 societies with high geographic mobility 
and  weak  connections  between  the  generations,  than  in  system  1  societies  where 
recognised descent groups persisted over generations in the same place and regularly 
renewed marriage alliances with each other. The incentive to invest in financial and 
material  assets,  rather  than  in  children,  would  therefore  have  been  highest  in  the 
northwest.
6 
So, on the basis of the statistical evidence, an explanatory strategy that combines 
reproductive exchange with economic rationality performs better than either the SDT 
hypothesis or explanations based on economic rationality alone.  
A key point in favour of the importance of reproductive exchange is the evidence 
that  low  fertility  is  associated,  not  with  economic  modernity  as  such,  but  with  the 
degree of tension that exists between economic modernity (including the opportunities 
it offers to women)  and existing family forms. However, it is also possible to attribute 
low fertility to this tension –  as Le Bras (1997), Micheli (2000) and, in a way, Dalla 
Zuanna (2001) do –  without invoking the principles of reproductive exchange. So it is 
reasonable to ask what we gain by bringing reproductive exchange into the picture. The 
answer is that it provides a theoretically based explanation of why the tension between 
economic modernity and pre-existing family forms leads to reduced fertility – and that 
this explanation is backed by ethnographic data.  
However,  it  should  also  be  pointed  out  that  a  good  deal  more  ethnographic 
evidence would be needed to properly substantiate the reproductive exchange view. It 
                                                            
6 It is surprising, at first sight, that Carnia, with its cooperative economy and lineage-based cjasas, finds itself 
classed with northwestern societies in this respect (Breschi et al 1999) – but there is a possible explanation 
that would be consistent with section 3’s discussion about the circumstances in which investment in physical 
wealth would be preferred. This is that the choice of marriage partners was traditionally in the hands of the 
young people themselves – thus making it difficult for parents to use their children’s marriages as a basis of 
personal social capital, and so removing the motive for high fertility.  Heady: Fertility as a process of social exchange  
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would be particularly important to have ethnographic data concerning the ideological 
and ritual aspects of reproductive exchange and the messages they express about the 
physical reproduction of the next generation, and about the reproduction of the values 
and  relationships  that  underlie  cooperation  and  constitute  the  sense  of  community. 
While  studies  of  southern  and  east  European  communities  would  provide  valuable 
direct checks of this paper’s case study, the need for ethnographic data is greatest in 
north western Europe, where the central challenge would be to see whether comparable, 
but distinct, analyses of the symbolism of reproductive exchange could be made for the 
nuclear-family-based system that was characteristic of northwest Europe, and for the 
more flexible system that now seems to be emerging. 
 
 
6. Concluding discussion  
At the start of this paper I claimed that parents have children “in part at least, for the 
sake  of  other  people”.  Another  way  of  putting  it  would  be  …  “partly  in  order  to 
perpetuate  a  system  of  relationships”.  As  the  argument  developed,  I  made  various 
predictions  about  what  would  happen  if  an  underlying  commitment  to  reproductive 
exchange was combined with rational economic choice in other respects. Though the 
evidence assembled here is certainly not conclusive, all of it points in the right direction 
–  and  seems  to  show  that  this  theoretical  combination  of  two  kinds  of  exchange 
motivation is a serious competitor for both SDT and purely economic approaches.   
The theory set out in sections 2 and 3 of this paper is not meant to be specific to 
Europe. Indeed, if interactions between the principles of reproductive gift exchange and 
patterns of economic cooperation can be shown to influence fertility in Europe – where 
kinship ties are often supposed to be weaker than elsewhere – the theory has a good 
chance of being valid everywhere. This is not to say that specific conclusions drawn for 
European  societies  could  automatically  be  extended  to  other  places,  but  rather  that 
applying this approach, in the specific circumstances of the society concerned, would 
explain (or at least help to explain) the changing local patterns of fertility. In that sense, 
this paper represents an attempt to produce a general theory that can take account of the 
richness of specific detail produced by studies in the tradition of anthropological micro-
demography.  (For  the  methodological  views  underlying  this  aspiration  see  Heady 
2007.) 
However,  the  anthropological  demography  literature  is  not  short  of  theoretical 
statements (see the papers in Greenhalgh 1995, and Kertzer and Fricke 1997), some of 
which  –  such  as  Fricke’s  (1997)  work  on  reciprocity  and  Bledsoe’s  statement 
(1995:152) that “[c]hildren and their wellbeing become cultural symbols which adults 
use  to  shape  their  own  relations  with  each  other”  –  are  very  close  to  arguments Demographic Research: Volume 17, Article16 
http://www.demographic-research.org  489 
advanced here.  So what does the present approach add to the existing formulations 
concerning strategies, domestic power relationships, political and economic forces, and 
culture? I should say at once that it does not aim to replace all these statements, but I 
think it does two important things. 
Firstly, as the European examples have shown, it provides a unified framework for 
analysing the causal paths connecting different social and economic factors to fertility 
outcomes. Secondly, it provides a theory (or rather the barest outline of a theory) of 
individual  motivation  that  makes  it  possible  to  understand  how  the  decisions  of 
autonomous  individuals  could  nevertheless  give  rise  to  cultural  systems  of  fertility 
regulation, and how these systems might eventually adapt to economic change. Such an 
account  is  needed  because,  without  it,  there  is  no  way  of  connecting  cultural 
explanations  of  fertility  with  explanations  based  on  individual  strategies.  If  it  is 
accepted that the desire for continuity and balanced exchange, at personal and system 
levels,  is  an  innate  (but  not  always  overwhelming)  psychological  motive,  which  is 
capable of motivating adherence to cultural systems that offer a way of satisfying it, 
then the ontological gap between socio-cultural and personal-strategic explanations is 
closed. 
A few years ago, an argument of this kind would have run into trouble from two 
quarters: firstly from cultural constructionists suspicious of anything that looked like an 
appeal to universal human nature; and secondly from evolutionists who would query 
how such a socio-centric kind of motivation could possibly have evolved. However, 
given the growing anthropological interest in cognition (Enfield and Levinson 2006), 
and the recognition by contemporary evolutionists that far more cooperation takes place 
than can currently be explained by arguments based on either tit-for-tat reciprocity or 
direct forms of kinship altruism (Henrich et al 2003), the psychological implications of 
the argument advanced here might now receive a more sympathetic hearing.  
Of course the argument itself raises further questions about the cognitive processes 
that  underlie  both  the  recognition  of  new  (and  existing)  kinship  units  and  the 
identification  of  the  wider  field  of  relationships  involved  in  the  process  of  self-
perpetuating  exchange.  However,  since  these  questions  must  also  be  answered 
eventually by any theory of reproductive exchange (regardless of whether it specifically 
focuses on fertility) – and since the broad outlines of gift exchange theory, and its 
application to gifts of human life, have survived and developed over more than eighty 
years  of  empirical  investigation  and  theoretical  controversy  –  it  is  likely  that  valid 
cognitive explanations can be found. If the empirical demands of demography stimulate 
this search, then the quantitative requirements of demographic analysis may turn out to 
have unexpectedly close connections to fundamental developments in anthropological 
theory .    Heady: Fertility as a process of social exchange  
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